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FOREWORD
Gray zone warfare has increasingly been the strategy selected by states that are determined to influence
change without the risk of major escalation to outright
military war. It is a significant concern today, threatening U.S. national security as well as the security of
U.S. allies and partners. Although warfare is traditionally led by the Department of Defense (DoD), as
the use of gray zone warfare increases and evolves, a
whole-of-government approach that incorporates the
unique capabilities of Federal departments and agencies for this fight is needed.
In this monograph, Ms. Elizabeth Troeder builds
the case for convening a National Security Council/
Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) meeting whenever
any Federal agency deems a gray zone approach to
an international issue is appropriate, ensuring that a
whole-of-government solution is developed. She also
advocates the establishment of a standing National
Security Council/Policy Coordination Committee
(NSC/PCC) for gray zone solutions, with sub-NSC/
PCCs for each of the United States’ most active adversaries so that subject matter experts from the DoD,
Department of State, Department of Commerce,
Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Justice, Department of the Treasury, and the national
intelligence community can be quickly assembled in
times of crisis.
The appropriate size of the NSC has been debated
for decades. Adversaries of a larger NSC argue that
the bureaucratic process may take too long to develop
solutions, with the potential risk of media leaks; advocates counter that a more solid product will emerge as
the result of input from a wider range of expertise. In

vii

the case of gray zone warfare, I believe it to be essential
that we consider all instruments of national power as
well as tools of national security policy, not just those
that the DoD has available. As Ms. Troeder says, “the
future of U.S. democracy depends on it.”

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Gray zone warfare, also known as irregular warfare,
political warfare, hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare,
and unconventional warfare, is increasingly becoming
the norm. It is a significant concern today, threatening
U.S. national security as well as the security of U.S.
allies and partners. Despite its population’s immense
capacity for creativity and innovation, the United
States is losing this war. The Department of Defense
(DoD) has historically led the gray zone war fight with
assistance from other Federal agencies. However, it
cannot require other agencies to engage, and it cannot
be aware of all of the effective tools available across
the whole-of-government, nor can it know how its
proposed way forward may conflict with approaches
made by other agencies. This monograph provides
an assessment of the gray zone tactics used against
the most active U.S. adversaries, and builds the case
for requiring U.S. Federal agencies to request that the
Deputy National Security Advisor convene a National
Security Council/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC)
meeting whenever any Federal agency deems a gray
zone approach to an international issue is appropriate.
It also recommends that a standing National Security
Council/Policy Coordination Committee (NSC/PCC)
for gray zone solutions be developed, with sub-NSC/
PCCs for each of the most active adversaries so that
experts can be quickly assembled in times of crisis.
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A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO
GRAY ZONE WARFARE
Gray zone warfare, also known as irregular warfare, political warfare, hybrid warfare, asymmetric
warfare, and unconventional warfare, is increasingly
becoming the norm. Yet the United States is losing this
war, despite its immense capacity for creativity and
innovation. The February 2018 indictment of 13 Russian nationals and 3 Russian companies for interfering
in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, using what was
described as “information warfare”—a form of gray
zone warfare—is the most vivid example of gray zone
tactics used against the United States. The U.S. Government and the American people were ill-prepared
for this type of warfare.
The Department of Defense (DoD) has historically
led the gray zone war fight with assistance from other
Federal agencies. However, the DoD cannot require
other agencies to engage in this fight, nor can it be
aware of all of the effective tools available across the
whole-of-government. Most importantly, leadership
at the DoD cannot know how or if its proposed solutions conflict with or potentially harm the approaches
being used by other Federal agencies unless all of
those agency approaches are considered from a
whole-of-government perspective.
This monograph builds the case for requiring U.S.
Federal agencies to request that the Deputy National
Security Advisor convene a National Security Council/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) meeting whenever any Federal agency deems a gray zone approach
to an international issue is appropriate. It also recommends the development of a standing National Security Council/Policy Coordination Committee (NSC/
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PCC) for gray zone solutions, with sub-NSC/PCCs
for each component of the 4+1 (Russia, China, Iraq,
North Korea, and violent extremist organizations)
so that experts can be quickly assembled in times of
crisis.1 The NSC/DC will oversee the NSC/PCC, as
prescribed by National Security Presidential Memo
randum (NSPM)-4 of April 4, 2017. This will assure
the President of the United States, Congress, and the
American people that all elements of power have been
employed and are synchronized.
THE GRAY ZONE
The term “gray zone” was coined by the U.S.
Army’s Special Operations Command “to describe
activities, actions, or conflict in the space between
peace and war.”2 Commander of U.S. Central Command, General Joseph L. Votel further describes that
space between peace and war as “characterized by
intense political, economic, informational, and military competition more fervent in nature than normal
steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional
war.”3 The types of campaigns waged within the gray
zone are numerous—all are considered elements of
soft power and are differentiated as instruments of
national power (diplomatic, information, military,
and economic) and tools of national security policy
(finance, intelligence, and law enforcement).
Gray zone strategies are not new. In The Art of War,
written in 500 B.C. and credited to Chinese military
strategist Sun Tzu, the author wrote, “To subdue the
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”4 In 400
B.C., Kautilya, who was an Indian advisor to the first
king of the Maurya Empire and is credited with writing the political essay, Arthashastra, recommended the
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use of secret agents, assassins, disinformation, deception, and the weakening of bonds between united
adversaries to create an opportunity for his king. In the
20th century, the United States used gray zone tactics
in Vietnam and during the Cold War. For example, the
U.S. Army’s 7th Psychological Operations Group used
propaganda to misinform the enemy during the Vietnam War. During the Cold War, an information campaign was used both to harm the enemy and to gain
U.S. public support against communism:
In 1950, the Central Intelligence Agency created
the Congress for Cultural Freedom with the goal of
undermining the Soviet Government and winning
over the hearts and minds of Europe’s left-leaning
intellectuals.5

For example, books such as Dr. Zhivago by Boris Pasternak, music such as The Rites of Spring by Igor Stravinsky, and the film version of Animal Farm by George
Orwell were given to unsuspecting Soviet patrons
of the arts in Europe who thought they were acquiring decadent, exciting material. Not cognizant of the
underlying message, they then distributed it to other
patrons of the arts throughout the Soviet Union, thus
unknowingly propagating the U.S. message in the
Soviet Union. In the United States, the organization
that was commonly known as the “Children’s Crusade
against Communism,” targeted American children in
the 1950s and 1960s through the use of comic books,
cards tucked into bubblegum wrappers, and school
textbooks to generate U.S. support against communism. In addition, American television, movies, music,
and art conveyed messages promoting the advantages
of democracy.
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The U.S. Army War College describes gray zone
strategies as activities undertaken by:
states dissatisfied with the status quo and determined
to change important aspects of the global distribution
of power and influence in their favor. Unwilling to risk
major escalation with outright military adventurism,
these actors are employing sequences of gradual steps
to secure strategic leverage. The efforts remain below
thresholds that would generate a powerful . . . response,
but nonetheless are forceful and deliberate, calculated to
gain measurable traction over time.6

Gray zone warfare is a significant concern today,
threatening U.S. national security as well as the security of our allies and partners.
STRATEGIC GUIDANCE
The need to improve interagency collaboration
in the United States has been deliberated ever since
that horrendous day on September 11, 2001, when the
terrorist attacks took place in New York; Pennsylvania; and, Washington, DC. Eleven days following the
attack, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was
created to oversee and coordinate “a comprehensive
national strategy to safeguard the country against terrorism and respond to any future attacks.”7 It was a
good start. Nevertheless, as the use of irregular warfare increases and evolves, a whole-of-government
approach that incorporates the unique capabilities of
Federal departments and agencies for this fight is also
needed.
The authors of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy―reports that
date back more than a decade―have stated that the
best method for achieving national security is using
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a whole-of-government approach. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report recommended “the
creation of National Security Planning Guidance to
direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities.”8 The 2009
Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report stated
that the DoD “supports institutionalizing whole-ofgovernment approaches to addressing national security challenges.”9 In the May 2010 NSS, President
Barack Obama devoted almost three pages to outlining a whole-of-government approach to strengthening U.S. national security. In June 2010, Director of
Defense Capabilities and Management John Pendleton, in his testimony before the House Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations, stated, “Agencies
lack adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate
this collaboration during planning and execution
of programs and activities.”10 Still, no changes were
made, and a lack of inclusive collaboration between
agencies persisted.
The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance states: “The
global security environment presents an increasingly
complex set of challenges and opportunities to which
all elements of U.S. national power must be applied.”11
Former President Obama’s Executive Order 13721 of
March 14, 2016, established the Global Engagement
Center within the U.S. Department of State, with the
mission to:
lead the coordination, integration, and synchronization
of Government-wide communications activities directed
at foreign audiences abroad in order to counter the
messaging and diminish the influence of international
terrorist organizations, including the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant, al Qa’ida, and other violent extremists
abroad.12
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In his 2017 NSS, President Donald Trump stated:
Our diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic
agencies have not kept pace with the changes in the
character of competition. . . . To meet these challenges we
must . . . upgrade our political and economic instruments
to operate across these environments.13

In January 2018, the DoD announced a reorganization within U.S. Cyber Command: “President Donald
Trump, in accordance with congressional mandate,
directed Cyber Command to elevate to a full unified
combatant command out from under Strategic Command.”14 As General Paul J. Selva said during his
Senate Armed Services Committee reconfirmation
as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July
2017, “Responding to hybrid warfare is an inherently
whole-of-government proposition.”15 The time to do
so is now.
The February 2018 indictment of 13 Russian nationals and 3 Russian companies for interfering in the
2016 U.S. Presidential election provided the impetus
for Attorney General Jeff Sessions to stand up the Justice Department’s Cyber-Digital Task Force to “advise
[him] on the most effective ways that this Department
can confront . . . threats [from criminals, terrorists, and
enemy governments] and keep the American people
safe.”16 The task force also provides Trump the opportunity to heighten public awareness of outside influences engaging in gray zone warfare, undermining
American democracy, and threatening U.S. national
security.
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UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENT
In December 2015, Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral John Richardson described the current threat
as “four-plus-one,” where the goal was to “balance
two ‘great powers’ of Russia and China, two ‘very
influential’ regional powers in Iran and North Korea,
and the ‘persistent global counterterrorism challenge’.”17 The term abbreviated “4+1” has endured,
describing the countries that are most active in the
gray zone today. Recent actions undertaken by the
4+1 indicate a profound need for a comprehensive,
measured approach in order to deny future effects of
gray zone warfare. Speaking to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2018, U.S. Director
of National Intelligence Daniel Coats said:
Russia is using a variety of capabilities short of war
to assert its presence. President [Vladimir] Putin will
continue to rely on assertive foreign policies to shape
outcomes beyond Russia’s borders. . . . Russia uses
these tools—including the cyber weapon—because it’s
relatively cheap, it’s low risk, it offers what they perceive
as plausible deniability, and it’s proven to be effective at
sowing division.18

Furthermore, China “will take a firm stance on
its claims to the East . . . and South China Sea[s], its
relations with Taiwan and its regional economic
engagement,” in addition to its “One Belt, One Road
initiative,”19 which seeks to improve China’s economic
condition throughout Asia, including the Middle East,
Africa, and Europe. With respect to Iran, Coats said:
“Iran will try to penetrate U.S. and allied networks for
espionage and lay the groundwork for future cyberattacks.”20 Coats also added, “And North Korea will
continue to use cyber operations to raise funds, launch
attacks and gather intelligence against the United
7

States.”21 A deeper understanding of each is needed,
as well as a call to action.
Russia
A resurgent Russia, demonstrating its aspirations
to regain its status as a world power, has launched an
extremely effective information campaign using “electronic warfare and other information warfare capabilities, including denial and deception as part of its
approach to all aspects of warfare.”22 Its “information
confrontation”—or in the Russian language, “informatsionnoye protivoborstvo (IPb)”—can be delineated into
two forms of destabilizing informational tactics:
[The] informational-technical effect is roughly analogous
to computer network operations, including computernetwork defense, attack, and exploitation. . . . [The]
informational-psychological effect refers to attempts to
change people’s behavior or beliefs in favor of Russian
governmental objectives.23

The United States has no such organized campaign.
As Commander, U.S. European Command General
Curtis Scaparrotti said before the House Armed Services Committee in March 2017: “we are not as effective as we could be . . . particularly in the information
domain.”24 To mitigate this, the 2017 NSS (Pillar III)
in reference to cyberspace states, “We will improve
the integration of authorities and procedures across
the U.S. Government so that cyber operations against
adversaries can be conducted as required.”25 In addition, a Presidential Executive Order on Strengthening
the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical
Infrastructure was issued to the U.S. Department of
Commerce and the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security on May 11, 2017. The draft report for public
8

comment from the study identifies the risks and proposes numerous actions to be taken by different
agencies, but does not identify a specific lead for the
execution of the individual actions.26 This issue will
be discussed later in the suggested approach toward
a solution.
Russian manipulation of the global information
environment is rampant, causing an informational-technical effect in the cyber environment. The Fancy
Bear reconnaissance program that, once downloaded,
allows hackers access to an individual’s computer has
been linked to Russia’s military intelligence agency.
U.S. intelligence claims that the malware allowed
hackers to breach the email account of John Podesta,
the former chairman of Hillary Clinton’s 2016 Presidential campaign. In 2015, hackers stole National
Security Agency (NSA) classified information from a
former NSA employee’s home computer after he illegally removed the data from the agency and loaded
it onto his personal equipment.27 In 2016, Russian
cyber-experts deliberately caused a significant power
blackout in Kyiv, Ukraine, by attacking a transmission
substation, which impacted electric grid operations
and caused subsequent power outages throughout
Ukraine; this blackout affected hospitals, banks, and
transportation for more than 225,000 customers for
approximately 6 hours.28
Each of these events and many more can be instigated again if action is not taken. The malware used
to cause the Kyiv power outage, known as CRASHOVERRIDE, combined with numerous clauses found
in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation
(2014), reveal an escalation from Russian programs
for reconnaissance to programs causing outright
destruction. Confirmation of this concern is provided
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in the Russian military doctrine known as Strategic
Operations to Destroy Critical Infrastructure Targets,
which “calls for escalating to deescalate” in an attempt
to “un-level the playing field,” per retired General
Martin Dempsey, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.29 The doctrine refers to the use of gray zone
capabilities, including the sabotage of adversaries’
energy grids as well as the deployment of nuclear
weapons.
The Russian drive to change people’s behavior in
favor of Russian objectives—the informational-psychological effect—has also been extremely successful.
This strategy, which embraces social media, has proliferated exponentially in the last decade. Russia’s staterun propaganda machine uses a variety of platforms
such as television and radio to amplify pro-Russian
themes, influence decision-making, and destabilize
both the United States and countries in Europe.30 The
television network RT (formerly Russia Today) and
the Russian Government-funded news agency Sputnik have both been identified in a U.S. intelligence
report “as being arms of Russia’s ‘state-run propaganda machine’ that served as a ‘platform for Kremlin messaging to . . . international audiences’.”31 Social
media is also employed, where both bots and people
are used to perpetuate the Russian agenda. Russia
is known to have meddled in the U.S., German, and
French Presidential elections of 2016, 2017, and 2017,
respectively. U.S. congressional investigators were
able to ascertain that more than 3,000 political advertisements displayed on the social media website Facebook during the U.S. Presidential election came from
Russia. The advertisements targeted “every group
in America [and they] were indiscriminate,” but
they created chaos at every level.32 In February 2018,
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prosecutors were able to indict 13 Russian nationals and 3 Russian companies with evidence that
included a:
detailed picture of how Russians used social media,
fake rallies, and secretive operatives in the U.S. to create
‘political intensity’ by backing radical groups, opposition
social movements and disaffected voters. . . . [The
Russian campaign] included direct contact with over 100
Americans.33

However, it is important to note that Deputy Attorney
General Rod Rosenstein told reporters, “This ‘information warfare’ by the Russians didn’t affect the outcome of the presidential election.”34
In the United Kingdom (UK), election officials suspect that Russia financed the political advertisements
surrounding Brexit that were displayed on social
media since a UK vote to leave the European Union
weakens the bonds among European countries, a
key objective of Russia. Moreover, “about 30 percent
of the Twitter accounts that magnified the Catalan
issue in Spain were registered in Venezuela but were
Russian.”35 Again, a Catalonian secession from Spain
would be another division within democratic Europe
and another win for Russia. Also significant are examples of Russia’s information campaign aimed at ethnic
Russians and Russian-speaking minorities living in
the Baltic States, which are “similar to . . . [the] disinformation efforts in Ukraine that led to Russia’s
annexation of the Crimean peninsula.”36 Assertions
such as these that minorities are being “mistreated,”
that there is “ethnic cleansing” of local Russian populations, and that “significant cities such as Klaipeda
never belonged to Lithuania” are efforts to destabilize the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and the United States.37 The
11

concern that what is now a non-kinetic conflict will
lead to a kinetic conflict and invocation of Article 5 of
the NATO Treaty, the principle of collective defense,
is significant. Per Article 5, “an attack against one
Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies” and
obligates them to defend any NATO member country
from attack by a non-member country.
China
Examples of China’s gray zone tactics are its
“One Belt, One Road” initiative as well as its “artificial island construction and militarization of facilities
on features in international waters,” especially in the
South China Sea.38 Both strategies expand China’s control in the Asian region and threaten national security,
trade, and economic growth, particularly for those
who require navigation through the South China Sea.
The three primary issues regarding China’s initiatives
in the South China Sea—which are not necessarily
consistent with international law—are multiple claims
to land masses, multiple claims to exclusive economic
zones, and restrictions of varying activities enforced
by claimants within their exclusive economic zones.39
As Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India stated,
“Respecting freedom of navigation and adhering to
international norms [are] essential for peace and economic growth in the inter-linked geography of the
Indo-Pacific.”40
Former President Obama attempted to reassure our
Asian allies and partners by making Asia a top priority for U.S. foreign policy. This “rebalancing” was not
successful as China continued to engage in land reclamation activities in the South China Sea in addition to
annexing the Spratly Islands. Finally, in 2016, the Chinese Government was challenged by the Philippines
12

in an international court when the Permanent Court
of Arbitration case number 2013-19 was brought to
The Hague in The Netherlands. The findings of this
landmark case refuted China’s claim to sovereignty in
the South China Sea; addressed Chinese interference
in traditional fishing rights, which were violations of
international law; and stated that China had failed to
protect and preserve the marine environment, causing
“irreparable damage . . . [in] the area.”41 In response:
a former senior Chinese official . . . said that the findings
would amount to no more than ‘waste paper’ and that
China would not back down from its activities in the
South China Sea even in the face of a fleet of American
aircraft carriers.42

President Trump’s “America First” doctrine, as
well as his withdrawal of the United States from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal almost immediately upon taking office in January 2017, caused
further consternation among our Asian allies and
partners. However, he acknowledged that freedom of
navigation of the seas is imperative for the economic
growth of both the United States and its Asian allies
in the 2017 NSS when he stated that China’s “efforts
to build and militarize outposts in the South China
Sea endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability.”43 On February 7, 2018:
U.S. Vice President Mike Pence referred to the possibility
of the United States returning to the Trans-Pacific
Partnership free trade deal when he met Deputy Prime
Minister Taro Aso [of Japan].44

Increased trade in the region will improve the
economies of U.S. allies and partners, increase stability
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in the region, and slow the rise of China. Currently,
the United States is using a conventional military
approach to protect its ships sailing in the South China
Sea. Although somewhat effective, there is the risk
that an enduring U.S. presence may aggravate China,
although it is unlikely to provoke the Chinese into
military escalation. Nevertheless, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea must remain an important
element of American policy.
Soft power was explicitly referenced in China’s
National Government policy for the first time at the
17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party in 2007, when President Hu Jintao said, “We
must ‘enhance culture as part of the soft power of our
country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural
rights and interests’.”45 A highlight of his proposed
methods included the need to improve Chinese media
in order to:
give correct guidance to the public and foster healthy social
trends; —to strengthen efforts to develop and manage
Internet culture and foster a good cyber environment; . . .
[and] create a thriving cultural market and enhance the
industry’s international competitiveness.46

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff
Department, Third Department, Second Bureau (similar to the U.S. NSA) is responsible for cyberespionage
operations:
Two PLA groups, Units 61938 and 61486, have reportedly
stolen information from over two dozen Defense
Department weapons programs, including the Patriot
missile system and the U.S. Navy’s new littoral combat
ship.47
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In June 2015, Politico reported that Chinese hackers
“breached a database containing a wealth of sensitive
information from federal employees’ security background checks.”48 It is believed that the Chinese Government is not only targeting the U.S. Government but
also U.S. defense contractors and think tanks. China’s
gray zone tactics used against the United States, its
allies, and its partners require unrelenting, focused
attention.
Iran
Iran’s soft power strategy includes using the media,
the distribution of money under the guise of charity,
as well as brazen bribery. Iran has also been charged
with denial-of-service attacks against 46 major financial institutions.
These attacks cut customers off from online access to
their bank accounts and cost the victim companies tens of
millions of dollars. . . . One of the hackers was also charged
with obtaining unauthorized access into the industrial
control systems of the Bowman Dam, located in Rye,
New York [in 2013]. Had the dam not been disconnected
from the system for maintenance, the intrusion could
have given the hacker control of the dam’s water levels
and flow rates.49

In terms of cyberespionage, one Iranian cyber-team:
has invaded computers around the world, with targets in
the petrochemical, defense, and aviation industries. The
group uses code linked to Iran’s wiper malware, possibly
in preparation for more destructive attacks. Another
group . . . has been active since at least 2014, targeting
companies in the financial, energy, telecom, and chemical
industries.50

15

In 2016, one such invasion included an attack on the
New York Stock Exchange and AT&T.
Recently, Iran expanded its Islamic Azad University to Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon with the goal of promoting Iranian ideological and political goals in an
educational environment. During his speech in January 2018, Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign policy advisor to
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei:
stressed that Iran’s soft power influence is helping the
‘expansion of Islam’ in different parts of the world,
including in China, India, and the Arab world—
particularly focusing on Shiite Islam.51

During his reconfirmation as Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Selva stated:
Iran seeks to achieve regional power and influence in the
Middle East through a variety of means. To advance its
strategic interests, it is pursuing more advanced missile
systems and a more capable naval presence that could
be used to threaten the Arabian Gulf region and Strait of
Hormuz in the event of conflict. It is also developing proxy
forces, supporting Shi’a movements, and promoting
other pro-regime elements throughout the region.52

Iran also fights a proxy war against Saudi Arabia in
Yemen by supporting a Shi’ite opposition group there,
provides support to President Bashar al-Assad in
Syria in its fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS), and works to expand its influence in Iraq.
Given its close ties to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran now
has direct access through Iraq and Syria across Israel’s
northern border to the Mediterranean Sea. Accordingly, General Votel said before the House Armed Services Committee in February 2018:
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Leaders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds
Force . . . have taken advantage of surrogates, businesses,
and logistics entities to execute direct action, intelligence,
influence building, terrorism, and cyber operations
against the U.S. and our partner nations.53

It is anticipated that “Iran will continue to pursue policies that threaten U.S. strategic interests and goals
throughout the Middle East while seeking to expand
diplomatic and economic relations with a wide range
of nations.”54
North Korea
North Korea’s state-sponsored criminal activity,
which is lucrative and widespread, reaches beyond
Asia into Europe and Africa. It has been characterized
as money laundering, cyberwarfare, drug trafficking, and smuggling primarily to fund its weapons of
mass destruction programs. A headline from a recent
Defense One article read, “Kim’s nuclear arsenal is
built to ‘deter and coerce’.”55 It has been found that
North Korean diplomats, as well as those posing as
North Korean diplomats, repeatedly abuse their privileges of diplomatic immunity in order to commit these
crimes. North Korea has been accused of money laundering for over a decade. In 2006, it was found to be:
producing ‘superdollar’ counterfeit $100 bills. The
Benjamins were so accurate, they were practically
indistinguishable from the real thing. The United States
was forced to redesign the bill in 2013, adding a ‘3D
security ribbon,’ tiny text, and color shifting images.56

As North Korea continued its practice, it was finally
“designated a ‘primary money laundering concern’
under the Patriot Act” in 2016.57
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North Korea’s cyber-activities have been ongoing
and disruptive for some time, but they are best known
for the attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2013,
when Sony embarked on creating the movie, The Interview, a comedy about assassinating the leader of North
Korea, Kim Jong-un.
The original release date of The Interview was targeted
for the end of 2014; however, before the movie could be
released an incident occurred that put hackers in complete
control of Sony Pictures Entertainment’s network [italics
in original].58

Retaliatory attacks against the American film
endeavor, which was considered embarrassing to
Kim Jong-un, consisted of stolen intellectual property,
extortion, the release of personally identifiable information, and a destroyed computer system. Despite
actions taken by North Korea and at former President Obama’s urging, Sony released the film, and “the
U.S. Government added new sanctions against North
Korea.”59
Since the 1970s, leadership in Pyongyang has been
rewarding drug traffickers and smugglers, primarily
of illegal rhino horn and ivory from Zimbabwe and
Zambia, but also the traffickers and smugglers of gold
from Bangladesh, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, and cigarettes. Although “North Koreans have been implicated in 18 of at least 29 detected rhino horn and ivory
smuggling cases involving diplomats in Africa since
1986,” the practice continues.60 In 2013:
North Korea sent a large amount of illegal drugs to its
embassy in an East European Country. . . . [Apparently,
Pyongyang had] ordered each diplomat to raise
US$300,000 to prove their loyalty and mark the birthday
of the nation’s founder Kim Il-sung.61
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At approximately the same time, methamphetamines
were smuggled into the United States and Australia. According to “a North Korean police officer who
defected to South Korea, methamphetamine manufacturing is frequently a joint operation of the Chinese
and North Korean underworld.”62
North Korea wields soft power in any way it can.
Skeptics of North Korea believed that improved relations between North and South Korea, particularly in
February 2018, were merely opportunistic propaganda
staged to avoid additional sanctions due to the North
Korean nuclear weapon and missile programs.
A few athletes, some winsome cheerleaders, and Kim
Yo-jong, the younger sister of North Korea’s dictator,
spread a shimmery mix of celebrity, hope, and Korean
fraternity over the Games—with the world’s media as
enablers.63

Kim Yo-jong flirted with the crowd at the opening ceremony of the 2018 Olympics in PyeongChang and was
celebrated in the media as “a beguiling emissary” and
“self-aware pageant star.” However, shortly thereafter, she was described as “a twisted sister” by The Wall
Street Journal, where it was reported that Kim Yo-jong
is:
a deputy director of the powerful and omnipresent
Propaganda and Agitation Department . . . [where its]
mission is to control not only the media but minds—to
indoctrinate all North Koreans, at all levels, in the absolute
supremacy of Kim Jong-un and his Workers’ Party.64

The BBC described her as “North Korea’s secret
weapon . . . the master of her brother’s image.”65 It
seems that not everyone was fooled by her smile after
all.
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Violent Extremist Organizations
China and Russia have proven themselves to be
quite skilled in gray zone warfare; Iran and North
Korea, although becoming more skilled, have not
been quite as deleterious as China and Russia have
been, yet. Although their information campaigns have
been extremely compelling, violent extremist organizations’ (VEOs) gray zone operations have been limited mainly to one domain. Thus far, VEOs have only
proven themselves proficient in using social media
to disseminate propaganda, generate support, and
broadcast violent interpretations of Islam.
The National Security Council
The NSC was created in the United States by the
National Security Act of 1947 and appears in Title I,
Section 101, “Coordination for National Security.” The
original role of the NSC was to promote interagency
cooperation on emerging policy issues. It has evolved
to:
advise the President with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the
national security so as to enable the military services and
the other departments and agencies of the Government
to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the
national security.66

NSC members are required per Title 50 U.S. Code §
3021; others are added at the President’s discretion. On
January 28, 2017, President Trump released NSPM-2,
which reorganized the NSC to reflect his needs. This
action was superseded on April 4, 2017, by NSPM-4,
which is used today.
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Although there are many changes from the way
former President Obama organized his NSC, the
NSC/DC under President Trump remains the same
as former President Obama’s and “shall continue to
serve as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum” for
national security issues.67 The NSC/DC is convened
and chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor.
The attendees to the NSC/DC are the Deputy Secretary
of State, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Attorney General, Deputy
Secretary of Homeland Security, Deputy Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, National Security Advisor to the Vice
President, Deputy National Security Advisor, Deputy
Homeland Security Advisor, and Administrator of the
U.S. Agency for International Development. In addition, any “Deputy Assistant to the President for the
specific regional and functional issue under consideration shall also be invited to attend.”68
Also pertinent are the NSC/PCCs, previously
called Interagency Policy Committees, or NSC/IPCs,
under former President Obama. The mission of NSC/
PCCs continues to be “management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple executive departments and agencies.”
They are “the main day-to-day fora for interagency
coordination of national security policies.”69
Staff on the NSC typically focus on foreign and
defense policy issues, crisis management, and urgent
matters requiring well-considered solutions. They are
not generally focused on long-term strategy. Effective national security policy is based on a measured
assessment of these matters, as “international economic, banking, environmental, and health issues . . .
[become] increasingly important to . . . [U.S.] national
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security.” However, the need for interagency coordination with NSC oversight and direction is equally
imperative.70
PROBLEM STATEMENT
A whole-of-government approach is needed to
deny the effects of gray zone warfare undertaken by
U.S. adversaries and to secure American gray zone
superiority. This approach is vital in order to protect U.S. national security and to preserve American
democracy.
DEVELOPING THE APPROACH
In this volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment, where gray zone warfare is increasingly the norm, the U.S. Government must become
better at defeating its adversaries using superior nonkinetic tactics. In addition, due to the accelerating
speed at which technological and social changes are
occurring, it is more essential than ever that bureaucratic processes become more efficient so as to meet
these rapidly emerging challenges. The U.S. Government no longer has the luxury to work in stovepipes;
it is imperative that it works more collaboratively.
Currently, the DoD develops gray zone strategies by engaging with other Federal agencies when it
deems necessary. However, due to its circumscribed
authorities, the DoD cannot require other agencies
to engage in its processes. In addition, the DoD is
more focused on conventional warfare. It, therefore,
cannot also focus on all of the effective, non-kinetic
tools available across the whole-of-government. Most
importantly, leadership at the DoD cannot know how
or if its proposed solutions conflict with approaches
being used by other Federal agencies unless all of
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those agency approaches are considered from a
whole-of-government perspective. Therefore, it is
recommended that whenever a U.S. Federal agency
believes that a U.S. Government gray zone approach
is the best approach to take in response to an issue or
event, it should formally request the Deputy National
Security Advisor to convene an NSC/DC meeting to
discuss the issue or event and propose a way forward.
All NSC/DC members would be required to attend.
NSC/PCCs “provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the national
security system” and are primarily at the assistant
secretary level.71 A standing NSC/PCC for gray zone
solutions should be developed with sub-NSC/PCCs
for each component of the 4+1. Specifically, the following sub-NSC/PCCs should be developed: a subNSC/PCC for Russia; a sub-NSC/PCC for China; a
sub-NSC/PCC for Iran; a sub-NSC/PCC for North
Korea; and a sub-NSC/PCC for VEOs. These subNSC/PCCs would ensure that the appropriate subject matter experts are included in the development of
gray zone solutions. The lines of effort for each subNSC/PCC for gray zone solutions would be to identify diplomatic options, led by a Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State and assisted by a Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense; identify information opportunities, also led by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
but assisted by a director from U.S. Cyber Command;
identify intelligence opportunities, led by the appropriate senior official from the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence and assisted by a Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; identify military opportunities, led by a Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense and assisted by the Vice Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command; identify
economic and financial opportunities, led by a Deputy
23

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and assisted by
a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of
Commerce; and identify law enforcement opportunities, led by the Deputy Associate Attorney General
and assisted by a Deputy Assistant Secretary from the
Department of Homeland Security. (See figure 1.)
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Source: Elizabeth G. Troeder.

Figure 1. Proposed Whole-of-Government Approach
to Gray Zone Warfare72
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Recommendation: U.S. Federal agencies engage with the Deputy National Security Advisor to convene a National Security
Council/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) meeting whenever any Federal agency deems a gray zone approach to an international issue is
appropriate. Also recommended: development of a standing National Security Council/Policy Coordination Committee (NSC/PCC) for
gray zone solutions, with sub-NSC/PCCs for each component of the 4+1 so that experts can be quickly assembled in times of crisis.
The NSC/DC will oversee the NSC/PCC, as prescribed by National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)–4 of April 4, 2017. This
will assure the President of the United States, Congress, and the American people that all elements of power have been employed
and are synchronized.

Recommendation for a Standing National Security
Council/Policy Coordination Committee
(NSC/PCC) for Gray Zone Solutions

Meetings of the NSC/DC are held on a regular
basis. Meetings of the standing NSC/PCC for gray
zone solutions would also be required on a regular basis, during which prescribed tasks undertaken
by the sub-PCCs would be assessed. Upon approval
by the NSC/PCC for gray zone solutions, courses of
action would be provided to the NSC/DC for review.
The sub-PCCs could meet as often as required while
developing the products that will be sent to the next
NSC/PCC for gray zone solutions meeting.
“‘The most important part of the deputies meeting is the pre-reads. This gives people the chance to
prepare’.”73 The day prior to each NSC/DC meeting,
all NSC/PCC for gray zone solutions products should
be delivered to the NSC staff who would compile the
products into one book to be reviewed and discussed
by members of the NSC/DC. New tasks to the NSC/
PCC could be disseminated at the conclusion of each
NSC/DC meeting; ultimately, a unified, whole-of-government approach to deny an adversary’s attack or
a unified approach to confronting an issue would be
developed.
The U.S. Army War College advocates for an ends,
ways, and means approach to devising strategy. In
this case, the “ends” is a unified, whole-of-government
approach to a gray zone issue. The “ways” is through
a meaningful, collaborative, interagency assessment of
the gray zone issue. The “means” are members of the
NSC/DC, the recommended standing NSC/PCC for
gray zone solutions, and the recommended sub-NSC/
PCCs.
However, there are risks to this approach. The
inherent risk is that some opponents to a large NSC
worry that the bureaucratic process may take too long
to develop a unified, whole-of-government approach
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to the problem. Advocates of a more structured, inclusive approach argue that a more solid product would
emerge as the result of input from those with such
diverse expertise. “One of the few ways of counteracting such homogenization is to hear from competing government agencies. There is more likelihood
one will see the other’s blind spots.”74 Advocates have
also said, “The NSC staff’s job is to make sure that ultimately the president gets all the options, all the information, and all sides of the issue. That’s the important
job that I think only the NSC can do.”75 In support of
interagency meetings at the NSC/PCC level:
NSC staff should monitor progress but should never be
put in actual charge of operational task forces; placing
them in charge of operations can cause the NSC staff
to become treated as an ‘agency’ for various purposes,
resulting in legal difficulties.76

With additional committees within the NSC, there
is a corresponding increased risk of leaks to the media.
However, there will always be those who believe that
the public has a right to know everything, such as
Edward Snowden, the former intelligence contractor
who leaked classified information to the public. The
external risk of a U.S. response to a gray zone attack
leaked to the public could be significant; the U.S. Government risks repercussions from both adversaries
and the American public.
The risks to implementation are primarily cultural.
Examples include the DoD, which is accustomed to
moving forward unilaterally, and the Central Intelligence Agency, which may become frustrated with
having to disclose more information than it is comfortable providing. In addition, it may seem to NSC/PCC
member agencies that the Department of Justice takes
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an inordinate amount of time to develop a proposed
solution. Nevertheless, input from the whole-ofgovernment must be considered in order to develop
the best approach to gray zone warfare. The future of
U.S. democracy depends on it.
CONCLUSION
The DoD, with assistance from other Federal agencies, has historically led the gray zone war fight, the
“conflict in the space between peace and war.”77 However, history has shown that this unilateral approach is
not sufficient. In fact, we have known for more than a
decade that a unified, whole-of-government response
to gray zone attacks is needed. We can no longer postpone implementing a solid response mechanism. As
such, the author recommends that U.S. Federal agencies request the Deputy National Security Advisor to
convene an NSC/DC meeting whenever any agency
deems a gray zone approach to an international issue
is appropriate, and that a standing NSC/PCC for gray
zone solutions be stood up, with sub-NSC/PCCs for
each of our greatest adversaries: Russia, China, Iran,
and North Korea, as well as for VEOs.
In previous crisis situations that required coordination of whole-of-government experts, the White
House has issued Presidential Policy Directives that
included the scope of the response required, the lead
Federal agency, guiding principles, lines of effort,
and required coordination efforts. In a crisis situation requiring a gray zone response, a similar directive should be issued. In this case, all instruments of
national power (diplomatic, information, military,
and economic) and tools of national security policy
(finance, intelligence, and law enforcement) must be
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considered; the appropriate Deputy Assistant Secretary (or equivalent) responsible for each instrument of
national power or tool of national security should be
designated the lead of that line of effort, with a Deputy
Assistant Secretary (or equivalent) from an appropriate fellow department or agency available to assist,
as described earlier and shown in figure 1. Through
a meaningful, collaborative, interagency assessment
of the gray zone issues, reconciliation of all valid
opportunities developed by sub-NSC/PCCs to ensure
that they do not conflict, and with the development
of phased courses of action, the United States will
defeat the adversary in gray zone warfare. As President Trump stated in the December 2017 NSS: “The
United States will fuse our analysis of information
derived from the diplomatic, information, military,
and economic domains to compete more effectively on
the geopolitical stage.”78 Through these actions, U.S.
national security and American democracy will be
preserved.
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